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Expectations, learning and monetary policy: 
an overview of recent research 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 32/2007 
George W Evans – Seppo Honkapohja 




Expectations about the future are central for determination of current 
macroeconomic outcomes and the formulation of monetary policy. Recent 
literature has explored ways for supplementing the benchmark of rational 
expectations with explicit models of expectations formation that rely on 
econometric learning. Some apparently natural policy rules turn out to imply 
expectational instability of private agents’ learning. We use the standard New 
Keynesian model to illustrate this problem and survey the key results for interest-
rate rules that deliver both uniqueness and stability of equilibrium under 
econometric learning. We then consider some practical concerns such as 
measurement errors in private expectations, observability of variables and 
learning of structural parameters required for policy. We also discuss some recent 
applications, including policy design under perpetual learning, estimated models 
with learning, recurrent hyperinflation, and macroeconomic policy to combat 
liquidity traps and deflation. 
 
Keywords: imperfect knowledge, learning, interest-rate setting, fluctuations, 
stability, determinacy 
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Odotukset, oppiminen ja rahapolitiikka: 
katsaus viimeaikaiseen kirjallisuuteen 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 32/2007 
George W Evans – Seppo Honkapohja 




Tulevaisuutta koskevat odotukset ovat keskeisiä tekijöitä tämänhetkisen makro-
taloudellisen tilanteen määräytymisessä ja rahapolitiikan muotoilussa. Viime-
aikainen kirjallisuus on tarkastellut tapoja täydentää benchmark-oletuksena käy-
tettyä rationaalisten odotusten hypoteesia. Tutkimuksissa on kehitetty eksplisiitti-
siä malleja odotusten muodostumisesta eli nk. ekonometrisestä oppimisesta. Uusi 
perustulos on se, että jotkut luontevat politiikkasäännöt johtavat epävakaisuuteen 
yksityisten taloudenpitäjien odotusten muodostumisprosessissa. Tutkimuksessa 
käytetään tavanomaista uuskeynesiläistä mallia ongelman havainnollistamiseksi. 
Artikkelissa esitetään katsaus niihin korkosääntöihin, jotka tuottavat mallissa 
yksikäsitteisen ja yksityisten taloudenpitäjien odotusten muodostumisprosessin 
suhteen stabiilin tasapainon. Tämän jälkeen artikkelissa tarkastellaan joitakin käy-
tännön ongelmia, kuten odotuksia koskevia mittausvirheitä, joidenkin muuttujien 
havaittavuutta ja korkosäännössä tarvittavien rakenneparametrien estimointia. 
Lopuksi artikkelissa tarkastellaan joitakin viimeaikaisia sovellutuksia erityistilan-
teisiin, kuten politiikan suunnittelu jatkuvan oppimisen olosuhteissa, toistuvat 
hyperinflaatiot ja nk. likividiteettiloukun torjumiseen soveltuva talouspolitiikka. 
 
Avainsanat: epätäydellinen tietämys, oppiminen, korkojen asetanta, talouden vaih-
telut, stabiilisuus, tasapainon yksikäsitteisyys 
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The conduct of monetary policy in terms of interest rate or other rules has been
extensively studied in recent research.1 This literature gives a central role for
forecasts of future inﬂation and output, and the question of whether monetary
policy should be forward-looking has been subject to discussion and debate.
Bank of England Inﬂation Reports, see Bank of England (2007), and the June
and December Issues of the Monthly Bulletin of the European Central Bank,
see European Central Bank (2007), present private sector forecasts as well as
internal macroeconomic projections. Empirical evidence on Germany, Japan
and the US since 1979 provided by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) suggests
that central banks are forward-looking in practice.
The rational expectations (RE) hypothesis, the standard benchmark in
macroeconomics since the seminal work of Luca (1976) and Sargent and
Wallace (1975), has been employed in most of the research on monetary policy
and interest rate rules. The most common formulation of the RE hypothesis is
based on the assumption that the private agents and the policy-maker know the
‘true model of the economy’, except for unforecastable random shocks.2 The
RE assumption is excessively strong: neither private agents nor policy-makers
have perfect knowledge of the economy. In reality, economists formulate and
estimate models that are used to make macroeconomic forecasts and carry out
policy analysis. These models are re-estimated and possibly reformulated as
new data becomes available. In other words, economists engage in learning
processes about the economy as they attempt to improve their knowledge of
the economy.
Formal study of these learning processes and their implications for
macroeconomic dynamics and policy-making are becoming an increasingly
important line of research in macroeconomics.3 This research is based on a
principle of cognitive consistency stating that private agents and policy-makers
in the economy behave like applied economists and econometricians. Thus, it is
postulated that expectations of macroeconomic variables are formed by using
statistical or other formal forecasting models and procedures.
An important policy question is whether the processes of learning create
new tasks and constraints for macroeconomic policy. An aﬃrmative answer
to this question has been demonstrated by the recent work on learning and
monetary policy.4 This view is also reﬂected in recent speeches by two
prominent Central Bank Governors, see Trichet (2005) and Bernanke (2007).
1Woodford (2003) is a monumental treatise on the subject, while the text of Walsh (2003)
provides an accessible graduate-level treatment. For surveys see eg Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999), and McCallum (1999).
2It should be noted that some papers do extend the standard notion of RE equilibrium
to an equilibrium with limited information. In many cases such extensions assume that
economic agents do not observe some variables but do know the structure of the economy.
3Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide a treatise on the analysis of adaptive learning and
its implications in macroeconomics. Evans and Honkapohja (1999), Evans and Honkapohja
(1995), Marimon (1997), Sargent (1993) and Sargent (1999) provide surveys of the ﬁeld.
4Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) and Bullard (2006) provide surveys of the recent
research.
7This research has shown that interest-rate setting by monetary policy-makers
faces two fundamental problems.
First, some of the proposed interest rate rules may not perform well when
the expectations of the agents are out of equilibrium. The consequences of
errors in forecasting, and the resulting correction mechanisms, may create
instability in the economy. For (usually non-optimal) instrument rules, Bullard
and Mitra (2002) consider the stability of rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) when monetary policy is conducted using variants of the Taylor rule.
These rules work well only under certain parameter restrictions, and Bullard
and Mitra suggests that monetary policy-making should take into account the
learnability constraints on the parameters of policy behavior. For optimal
monetary policy Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2006) show that certain standard forms of optimal interest rate setting by
the Central Bank can lead to expectational instability as economic agents
unsuccessfully try to correct their forecast functions over time. Evans and
Honkapohja also propose a new rule for implementing optimal policy that
always leads to stability under learning.
Second, monetary policy rules, including some formulations for optimal
setting of the instrument and some Taylor rules based on forecasts of inﬂation
and output gap, can create multiple equilibria, also called indeterminacy of
equilibria.5 Under indeterminacy there are multiple, even continua of REE
and the economy need not settle on the desired REE. The possible rest points
have been studied using stability under learning as a selection criterion, see
Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and the further papers by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2004) and Evans and McGouh (2005a). We note that indeterminacy is not
a critical problem if the fundamental REE is the only stable equilibrium
under learning. Moreover, indeterminacy need not arise if the forward-looking
interest rate rule is carefully designed, as was shown by Bullard and Mitra
(2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003c), and Evans and Honkapohja (2006).
The central message from these studies is that monetary policy has
important new tasks when agents’ knowledge is imperfect and agents try
to improve their knowledge through learning. Policy should be designed
to facilitate learning by private agents so that expectations do not create
instability in the economy.
Recently, many further aspects of expectations, learning and monetary
policy have been analyzed in the rapidly expanding literature. In this paper
we provide a non-technical overview of this research program. In the ﬁrst part
of the paper we begin by reviewing the basic theoretical results, after which
we take up some immediate practical concerns that can arise in connection
with rules for interest rate setting. These include issues of observability in
connection with private forecasts as well as with current output and inﬂation
data. A second concern is knowledge of the structure of the economy that is
required for implementation of optimal interest rate policies.
In the second part of the paper we provide an overview of the recent
and ongoing developments in the literature. We ﬁrst summarize research
5This was ﬁrst noted by Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999b), and Svensson
and Woodford (2005). The problem was systematically explored for Taylor rules by Bullard
and Mitra (2002).
8on learnability of REE when the basic New Keynesian model is extended to
incorporate further features of the economy. After this we discuss four topics
of applied interest in more detail: policy design under perpetual learning,
estimated models with learning, recurrent hyperinﬂations, and macroeconomic
policy to combat liquidity traps and deﬂation.
2T h e m o d e l
We conduct our discussion using the New Keynesian model that has become
the workhorse in the analysis of monetary policy, and we employ directly
its linearized version. The original nonlinear framework is based on a
representative consumer and a continuum of ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated
goods under monopolistic competition. Nominal stickiness of prices arises from
constraints of ﬁrms on the frequency of price changes, as originally suggested
by Calvo (1983).
The behavior of the private sector is summarized by the two equations




txt+1 + gt (2.1)
which is the ‘IS’ curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer
optimization, and
πt = λxt + βE
∗
tπt+1 + ut (2.2)
which is the price setting rule for the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, often
called the New Keynesian Phillips or aggregate supply curve.
Here xt and πt denote the output gap and inﬂation rate for period t,
respectively. it is the nominal interest rate, expressed as the deviation from
the steady state real interest rate. The determination of it will be discussed
below. E∗
txt+1 and E∗
tπt+1 denote private sector expectations of the output
gap and inﬂation next period. Since our focus is on learning behavior, these
expectations need not be rational (Et without ∗ denotes RE). The parameters
ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor with 0 <β<1.
For brevity we do not discuss details of the derivation of equations (2.1) and
(2.2). It should be pointed out that the derivation is based on individual Euler
equations under (identical) subjective expectations, together with aggregation
and deﬁnitions of the variables. The Euler equations for the current period
give the decisions as functions of the expected state next period. Rules
f o rf o r e c a s t i n gt h en e x tp e r i o d ’ sv a l u e so ft h es t a t ev a r i a b l e sa r et h eo t h e r
ingredient in the description of individual behavior. It is assumed that given
forecasts, private agents make decisions according to the Euler equations.6
















6This kind of behavior is boundedly rational but in our view reasonable since agents
attempt to meet the margin of optimality between the current and the next period. Other
models of bounded rationality are possible. Recently, Bruce Preston has proposed a








0 < |μ| < 1, 0 < |ρ| < 1 and ˜ gt ∼ iid(0,σ 2
g), ˜ ut ∼ iid(0,σ2
u) are independent
white noise. gt represents shocks to government purchases and/or potential
output. ut represents any cost push shocks to marginal costs other than those
entering through xt. For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that μ
and ρ are known (if not, they could be estimated).
The model is closed by an equation describing interest rate setting by the
Central Bank.7 One approach examines ‘instrument rules’ under which it is
directly speciﬁed in terms of key macroeconomic variables without explicit
policy optimization. A prominent example of this type is the standard Taylor
(1993) rule, ie
it = πt +0 .5(πt − ¯ π)+0 .5xt
where ¯ π is the target level of inﬂa t i o na n dt h et a r g e tl e v e lo ft h eo u t p u tg a p
is zero. (Recall that it is speciﬁed net of the real interest rate, which in the
standard Taylor rule is usually set at 2%). More generally, Taylor rules are of
the form it = χ0+χππt+χxxt. For convenience (and without loss of generality)
we will take the inﬂation target to be ¯ π =0so that this class of rules takes
the form
it = χππt + χxxt where χπ,χ x > 0 (2.4)
Variations of the Taylor rule replace πt and xt by lagged values or by forecasts
of current or future values.
Alternatively, interest rate policy can be derived explicitly to maximize a













where ¯ π is the inﬂation target. This type of optimal policy is often called
‘ﬂexible inﬂation targeting’ in the current literature, see eg Svensson (1999) and
Svensson (2003). The policy-maker is assumed to have the same discount factor
β as the private sector. α is the relative weight placed by the policy-maker on
the output target, and strict inﬂation targeting would be the case α =0 .T h e
loss function (2.5) can alternatively be viewed as a quadratic approximation to
the welfare function of a representative agent; see Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) and Woodford (2003).8
7We follow the common practice of leaving hidden the government budget constraint
and the equation for the evolution of government debt. This is acceptable provided ﬁscal
policy appropriately accommodates the consequences of monetary policy for the government
budget constraint. The interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policy can be important for the
stability of equilibria under learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2007a), McCallum (2003)
and Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007). We discuss some aspects of the interaction below.
8In this formulation α is a function of various ‘deep’ structural parameters in the fully
microfounded version of the model.
10The literature on optimal policy under RE distinguishes between optimal
discretionary policy, in which the policy-maker is unable to commit to policies
for future periods, and optimal policy in which such commitment is possible.
U n d e rc o m m i t m e n tt h ep o l i c y - m a k e rc a nd ob e t t e rb e c a u s eo ft h ee ﬀect on
private expectations, but commitment policy exhibits time inconsistency, in
the sense that policy-makers would have an incentive to deviate from the policy
in the future. Assuming that the policy has been initiated at some point in
the past (the ‘timeless perspective’ described by Woodford, 1999a), and setting
¯ π =0 ,t h eﬁrst order condition speciﬁes
λπt + α(xt − xt−1)=0 (2.6)
in every period.
Condition (2.6) for optimal policy with commitment is not a complete
speciﬁcation of monetary policy, since one must also provide a ‘reaction
function’ for it that implements the policy. A number of interest rate rules
are consistent with the model (2.1)—(2.2), the optimality condition (2.6), and
RE. However, some of the ways of implementing ‘optimal’ monetary policy
can make the economy vulnerable to either indeterminacy or expectational
instability or both, while other implementations are robust to these diﬃculties.
We will consider ‘fundamentals-based’ and ‘expectations-based’ rules. The
basic fundamentals-based rule depends only on the observable exogenous
shocks gt, ut and also on xt−1
it = ψxxt−1 + ψggt + ψuut (2.7)
where the optimal coeﬃcients are determined by the structural parameters and
the policy objective function. The coeﬃcients ψi are chosen so that the eﬀects
of aggregate demand shocks gt are neutralized and so that for inﬂation shocks
ut the optimal balance is struck between output and inﬂation eﬀects. The
dependence of it on xt−1 is optimally chosen to take advantage of the eﬀects
on expectations of commitment to a rule.9
Expectations-based optimal rules are advocated in Evans and Honkapohja
(2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) because, as further discussed below,
fundamentals-based optimal rules are often unstable under learning. If private
expectations are observable they can be incorporated into the interest rate
rule. If this is done appropriately, the REE will be stable under learning and
thus optimal policy can be successfully implemented. The essence of these
rules is that they do not assume RE on the part of private agents, but are
designed to feed back on private expectations in such a way that they generate
convergence to the optimal REE under learning. (If expectations are rational,
these rules deliver the optimal REE.)
The optimal expectations-based rule under commitment is




txt+1 + δggt + δuut (2.8)
9The coeﬃcients of the interest rate rule (2.7) are ψx = ¯ bx[ϕ−1(¯ bx−1)+¯ bπ], ψg = ϕ−1,a n d
ψu =[ ¯ bπ+ϕ−1(¯ bx+ρ−1)]¯ cx+¯ cπρ.H e r e¯ bx =( 2 β)−1[ς−(ς2−4β)1/2] with ς =1+β+λ
2/α,
and ¯ bπ =( α/λ)(1 −¯ bx), ¯ cx = −[λ + β¯ bπ +( 1− βρ)(α/λ)]−1, ¯ cπ = −(α/λ)¯ cx.
















This rule is obtained by combining the IS curve (2.1), the price setting
equation (2.2) and the ﬁrst order optimality condition (2.6), treating the
p r i v a t ee x p e c t a t i o n sa sg i v e n . 10
Interest rate rules based on observations of xt and πt that (outside
the REE) only approximate the ﬁrst order optimality condition (2.6) have
been considered by Svensson and Woodford (2005). They suggest a set of
‘hybrid’rules, the simplest of which would be
it = ψxxt−1 + ψggt + ψuut + θ[πt +( α/λ)(xt − xt−1)], θ>0 (2.10)
This rule combines the fundamentals-based rule (2.7) with the correction for
the ﬁrst order condition.11 Note that under RE the rule (2.10) delivers the
optimal equilibrium. Another hybrid rule has been suggested by McCallum
and Nelson (2004) taking the form
it = πt + θ[πt +( α/λ)(xt − xt−1)] (2.11)
where θ>0.
3 Determinacy and stability under learning
G i v e na ni n t e r e s tr a t er u l ew ec a no b t a i nt h er e d u c e df o r mo ft h em o d e la n d
study its properties under RE. Two basic properties of interest are determinacy
of the RE solution and stability under learning of the REE of interest.
Consider the system given by (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and one of the it policy











the reduced form can be written as
yt = ME
∗
tyt+1 + Nyt−1 + Pv t (3.1)
10Under optimal discretionary policy the ﬁrst order condition is λπt + αxt =0and the
coeﬃcients are identical except that δL =0 . The discretionary case is analyzed in Evans
and Honkapohja (2003c).
11The model and the interest rate rule analyzed in Svensson and Woodford (2005)
incorporate additional information lags.
12for appropriate matrices M, N and P. I nt h ec a s eo ft h er u l e( 2 . 4 )w eh a v e
N =0and thus the simpler system
yt = ME
∗
tyt+1 + Pv t (3.2)
We now brieﬂy describe the concepts of determinacy/indeterminacy and
stability under adaptive (least-squares) learning using the general frameworks
(3.1) and (3.2).
The ﬁrst issue of concern is whether under RE the system possesses a
unique stationary REE, in which case the model is said to be ‘determinate.’
If instead the model is ‘indeterminate,’ so that multiple stationary solutions
exist, these will include ‘sunspot solutions’, ie REE depending on extraneous
random variables that inﬂuence the economy solely through the expectations
of the agents.12
The second issue concerns stability under adaptive learning. In the
introduction we stressed the principle of cognitive consistency according to
w h i c ha g e n t si nt h em o d e la r ea s s u m e dt ob e h a v el i k ee c o n o m e t r i c i a n so r
statisticians when they form their expectations. In the next section this
approach is formalized in terms of the ‘Perceived Law of Motion’ (PLM)
describing the beliefs of the agents. These beliefs concern the stochastic
process followed by the endogenous (and exogenous) variables that need to
be forecasted. The parameters of the PLM are updated using an appropriate
statistical technique, called an adaptive learning rule, and forecasts are made
using the estimated PLM at each moment of time. If private agents follow an
adaptive learning rule like recursive least squares to update the parameters of
their forecasting model, will the RE solution of interest be stable, ie reached
asymptotically by the learning process? If not, the REE is unlikely to be
attained. This is the focus of the papers by Bullard and Mitra (2002), Bullard
and Mitra (2007), Evans and Honkapohja (2003c), Evans and Honkapohja
(2006) and many others.
3.1 Digression on methodology
Consider ﬁrst the simpler reduced form (3.2) under RE. It is well-known that
the condition for determinacy is that both eigenvalues of the 2×2 matrix M lie
inside the unit circle. In the determinate case the unique stationary solution
will be of the ‘minimal state variable’ (or MSV) form
yt =¯ cvt
where ¯ c is a 2×2 matrix that is easily computed. If instead one or both roots
lie inside the unit circle then the model is indeterminate. There will still be a
solution of the MSV form, but there will also be other stationary solutions.
12If the model is indeterminate, one can ask whether the sunspot solutions are stable under
learning. For a general discussion see Evans and Honkapohja (2001). In general, diﬀerent
forms of sunspot solutions exist, and stability under learning can depend on the particular
representation, see Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) and Evans and McGough (2005b).
13Next, we consider the system (3.2) under learning. Suppose that agents
believe that the solution is of the form
yt = a + cvt (3.3)
but that the 2 × 1 vector a and the 2 × 2 matrix c are not known but instead
are estimated by the private agents. (3.3) is the PLM of the agents. Note that
we include an intercept vector because, although for theoretical simplicity we
have translated all variables to have zero means, in practice agents will need
to estimate intercept as well as slope parameters.13




tyt+1 = a + cFvt
where either F is known or is also estimated. Inserting these expectations into
(3.2) and solving for yt we get the implied ‘Actual Law of Motion’ or ALM, ie
the law that yt would follow for a ﬁxed PLM (a,c).14 This is given by
yt = Ma+( P + McF)vt
We have thus obtained an associated mapping from PLM to ALM given by
T(a,c)=( Ma,P + McF)
and the RE solution (0,¯ c) is a ﬁxed point of this map.
Under real-time learning the sequence of events is as follows.15 Private
agents begin period t with estimates (at,c t) of the PLM parameters computed
on the basis of data through t−1. Next, exogenous shocks vt are realized and
private agents form expectations E∗
tyt+1 = at+ctFvt (assuming for convenience
that F is known). Following, for example, the rule (2.4) the central bank sets
the interest rate it,a n dyt is generated according to (2.1) and (2.2) together
with the interest rate rule. This temporary equilibrium is summarized by
(3.2). Then at the beginning of t +1agents add the new data point to their
information set to update their parameter estimates to (at+1,c t+1), eg using
least squares, and the process continues. The question of interest is whether
(at,c t) → (0,¯ c) over time.
It turns out that the answer to this question is given by the E-stability




where τ denotes notional time. If the REE (0,¯ c) is locally asymptotically stable
under this diﬀerential equation then the REE is stable under least squares and
13We remark that private agents and the policymaker are here assumed to observe the
shocks vt.I fvt is not observable then the PLM would be adjusted to reﬂect relevant available
information.
14The ALM describes the temporary equilibrium for given expectations as speciﬁed by
the forecasts from the given PLM.
15Formal analysis of learning and E-stability for multivariate linear models is provided in
Chapter 10 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
14closely related learning rules. Conditions for local stability of this diﬀerential
equation are known as expectational stability or ‘E-stability’ conditions. We
will also refer to these stability conditions as the ‘conditions for stability under
adaptive learning’, or the ‘conditions for stability under learning’, or even
‘learnability’ of equilibrium.
For the reduced form (3.2) it can be shown that the E-stability conditions
are that (i) the eigenvalues of M have real parts less than one and (ii) all
products of eigenvalues of M times eigenvalues of F have real parts less than
one. It follows that for this reduced form the conditions for stability under
adaptive learning are implied by determinacy but not vice versa.16 This is not,
however, a general result: sometimes E-stability is a stricter requirement than
determinacy and in other cases neither condition implies the other.
Consider next the reduced form (3.1). Standard techniques are available
to determine whether the model is determinate.17 In the determinate case the
unique stationary solution takes the MSV form
yt = a + byt−1 + cvt (3.4)
for appropriate values (a,b,c)=( 0 ,¯ b,¯ c). In the indeterminate case there are
multiple solutions of this form, as well as non-MSV REE.
To examine stability under learning we treat (3.4) as the PLM of the agents.
Under real-time learning agents estimate the coeﬃcients a, b, c of (3.4). This
is a vector autoregression (VAR) with exogenous variables vt. The estimates
(at,b t,c t) a r eu p d a t e da te a c hp o i n ti nt i m eb yr e c u r s i v el e a s ts q u a r e s .O n c e
again it can be shown that the E-stability principle gives the conditions for
local convergence of real-time learning.
For E-stability we compute the mapping from the PLM to the ALM as
follows. The expectations corresponding to (3.4) are given by
E
∗
tyt+1 = a + b(a + byt−1 + cvt)+cFvt (3.5)
where we are treating the information set available to the agents, when forming
expectations, as including vt and yt−1 but not yt. (Alternative information
assumptions would be straightforward to consider.) This leads to the mapping




2 + N,M(bc + cF)+P
¢
(3.6)
E-stability is again determined by the diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(a,b,c)=T(a,b,c) − (a,b,c) (3.7)
and the E-stability conditions govern stability under least-squares learning.
16See Mc Callum (2007) for conditions when determinacy implies E-stability.
17T h ep r o c e d u r ei st or e w r i t et h em o d e li nﬁrst order form and compare the number of
non-predetermined variables with the number of roots of the forward-looking matrix that
lie inside the unit circle.
153.2 Results for monetary policy
We now describe the determinacy and stability results for the interest rate
rules described in Section 2.
3.2.1 Taylor rules
Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider Taylor-type rules and ﬁnd that the results
are sensitive to whether the it rule conditions on current, lagged or expected
future output and inﬂation. In addition to assuming that χπ,χ x ≥ 0, they
assume that the serial correlation parameters in F are nonnegative. For the
rule (2.4) the results are particularly straightforward and natural.18 Bullard
and Mitra (2002) show that the REE is determinate and stable under learning
if and only if (using our notation)
λ(χπ − 1) + (1 − β)χx > 0
In particular, if policy obeys the ‘Taylor principle’ that χπ > 1, so that nominal
interest rates respond at least one for one with inﬂation, then determinacy and
stability are guaranteed.
If lagged or forward-looking Taylor rules are used the situation is more
complicated and full analytical results are not available. For the lagged variable
case they ﬁnd that for χπ > 1 and χx > 0 suﬃciently small the policy leads to
an REE that is determinate and stable under learning. For χπ > 1 but χx too
large the system is explosive.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) also look at forward-looking versions of the Taylor





txt+1 where χπ,χ x > 0 (3.8)
where we can interpret E∗
tπt+1 and E∗
txt+1 as identical one step ahead
forecasts, based on least-squares updating, used by both private agents and
policy-makers. They ﬁnd that for χπ > 1 and χx > 0 suﬃciently small the
policy leads to an REE that is determinate and stable under learning. Now for
χπ > 1 and χx large the system is indeterminate, yet the MSV solution is stable
under learning. However, there can also exist E-stable sunspot equilibria as was
shown by Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and discussed further by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2004) and Evans and McGough (2005a).
The Bullard and Mitra (2002) results emphasize the importance of the
Taylor principle in obtaining stable and determinate interest rate rules. At
the same time their results show that stability under learning must not be
taken for granted, even when the system is determinate so that a unique
stationary solution exists. The parameters of the policy rule χπ,χ x must be
appropriately selected by the policy-maker when an instrument rule describes
policy. Stability under learning provides a constraint for this choice.
18Throughout we will assume that we are not exactly on the border of the regions of
determinacy or stability.
163.2.2 Optimal monetary policy
Evans and Honkapohja (2006) focus on optimal monetary policy under
commitment. It turns out that under the fundamentals-based policy rule (2.7),
the economy is invariably unstable under learning. This is the case even though
with this rule there are regions in which the optimal REE is determinate.19





























Since typically β + λϕ > 1,s a y ,u p w a r dm i s t a k e si nE∗
tπt+1 lead to higher πt,
both directly and indirectly through lower ex ante real interest rates, which
under learning sets oﬀ a cumulative movement away from REE. The feedback
from xt−1 under the fundamentals-based it rule with commitment (2.7) does
not stabilize the economy. Figure 3.1 shows how divergence from the optimal
REE occurs under the rule (2.7).20
The instability of the fundamentals-based rules, designed after all to
obtain optimal policy, serves as a strong warning to policy-makers not to
automatically assume that RE will be attained. It is necessary to examine
explicitly the robustness of contemplated policy rules to private agent learning.
In Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) we
show how the problems of instability and indeterminacy can be overcome if
private agents’ expectations are observable, so that interest rate rules can be
in part conditioned on these expectations. In Evans and Honkapohja (2006)
we show that under the rule (2.8) the economy is determinate and the optimal
REE is stable under private agent learning for all possible structural parameter




































19It can be noted that the learning stability results are sensitive to the detailed information
assumptions. With PLM (3.4) if agents can make forecasts conditional also on yt then under
the fundamentals-based rule there are both regions of stability and instability, depending
on the structural parameters.
20Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are based on the calibration by McCallum and Nelson (1999). Using
other calibrations would yield similar results.





















Figure 3.1 Instability with fundamentals-based rule
In (3.10) the feedback from inﬂation expectations to actual inﬂation is
stabilizing since the coeﬃcient
αβ
α+λ2 is less than one and the inﬂuence of xt−1
is also weak. Thus, deviations from RE are oﬀset by policy and in such a way
that under learning private agents are guided over time to form expectations
consistent with the optimal REE. Our expectations-based rule obeys a form of
the Taylor principle since δπ > 1. Figure 3.2 illustrates convergence of learning
under the rule (2.8).




























































Figure 3.2 Stability with expectations-based rule
Note that our optimal policy rule conditions on both private expectations
and observable exogenous shocks, as well as lagged output. We also remark
that, when computing the optimal expectations-based rule, it is important for
the central bank to use the correct structural model of the IS and price setting
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n do nt h es p e c i ﬁc form of boundedly rational
individual behavior. For example, the form of the optimal expectations-based
rule would be diﬀerent if one adopted the long-horizon decision rules advocated
by Preston (2005) and Preston (2006).
There are some cases in which variations of fundamentals-based rules
can perform well, at least for a relevant region of structural parameter
values. For the ‘hybrid’rule suggested by Svensson and Woodford (2005)
numerical analysis shows that, in calibrated models, the rule (2.10) yields
both determinacy and stability under learning for suﬃciently high values of θ.
Similarly, the hybrid rule suggested by McCallum and Nelson (2004) appears
to deliver E-stability of the REE. Another favorable case emerges if the policy
objective (2.5) is extended to include a motive for interest rate stabilization.
Duﬀy and Xiao (2007b) show that in this case the fundamentals-based interest
rules can deliver determinacy and E-stability for a region of parameter values
that includes the usual calibrations used in the literature. However, see
our comments below concerning stability with constant-gain learning for
operational versions of these rules.
19Finally, we remark that other formulations of monetary policy than interest
rate rules could be analyzed. For example, policy could be formulated as
a money supply rule, where a prominent case is the Friedman proposal
for k−percent money growth. Evans and Honkapohja (2003d) show that
Friedman’s rule always delivers determinacy and E-stability in the standard
New Keynesian model. However, it does not perform well in terms of the
policy objective function.
3.3 Some practical concerns
Many of the it rules discussed above have the potential diﬃculty that they
may not be operational, as discussed in McCallum (1999). For example,
M c C a l l u ma n dN e l s o n( 2 0 0 4 )n o t et h a ti tm a yb eu n r e a l i s t i ct oa s s u m et h a t
policy-makers can condition policy on current xt and πt. Similarly, one could
question whether accurate observations on private expectations are available.
We consider these points in the reverse order. In the subsequent discussion
we focus on the expectations-based rule (2.8), the Taylor rule (2.4) and the
hybrid rules (2.10) and (2.11).
3.3.1 Observability of private expectations
The expectations-based rule (2.8) requires observations of current private
expectations of future variables. While survey data on private forecasts of
future inﬂation and various measures of future output exist, there are concerns
about the accuracy of this data. If observations of expectations are subject
to a white noise measurement error then our stability and determinacy results
are unaﬀected. Furthermore, if measurement errors are small then the policy
will be close to optimal. However, if measurement errors are large then this
will lead to a substantial deterioration in performance. In this case one might
consider substituting a proxy for such observations. Since we are assuming
that private agents forecast by running VARs, the most natural proxy is for
the Central Bank to estimate corresponding VARs and use these in (2.8).
Suppose now that agents and the Central Bank begin with diﬀerent
initial estimates, possibly have diﬀerent learning rules and/or use data sets
with diﬀerent initial dates. When the private agents and the Central Bank
are separately estimating and forecasting using VARs, we must distinguish
between their expectations. An extended E-stability analysis for economies
with heterogenous expectations gives the conditions for convergence of
heterogeneous learning, as shown in Honkapohja and Mitra (2006). For the
case of optimal discretionary policy and expectations-based interest rate rules
this issue was analyzed in Honkapohja and Mitra (2005b). In Evans and
Honkapohja (2003a) it was shown that using VAR proxies can also achieve
convergence to the optimal REE with commitment.
We remark that the form of the extended E-stability conditions for
heterogeneous learning depends on the nature of heterogeneity among agents.
If the heterogeneities are transient (in the sense described in Honkapohja
20and Mitra, 2006), then the standard E-stability conditions directly apply. In
cases of persistent heterogeneity the learning stability conditions are somewhat
sensitive to the detailed assumptions. Additional restrictions are required for
stability in some cases, eg if private agents estimate parameters using stochastic
gradient techniques while the Central Bank uses least squares.
3.3.2 Non-availability of current data
Ad i ﬃculty with the standard Taylor rule (2.4) as well as some other rules,
including the hybrid rules of Svensson and Woodford (2005) and McCallum and
Nelson (2004), is that they presuppose that the policy-maker can observe both
current output gap and inﬂation when setting the interest rate. McCallum
(1999) has criticized such policy rules as not being ‘operational’.
In the case of the Taylor rule, Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that this
problem of non-observability can be avoided by the use of ‘nowcasts’ E∗
tyt in
place of the actual data yt. Determinacy and E-stability conditions are not
aﬀected by this modiﬁcation.
For the hybrid rules performance depends on the rule. Numerical analysis
suggests that E-stability can still be achieved for Svensson-Woodford rule
under standard values of the parameters. In contrast, for the McCallum-Nelson
rule the situation is more complex. McCallum and Nelson (2004) suggest using
forward expectations in place of actual data. If this is done, determinacy
and stability under learning are no longer guaranteed, and suﬃciently large
values of the policy parameter θ induce both instability under learning and
indeterminacy. This is unfortunate since large values of θ are needed to achieve
a close approximation to optimal policy. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) argue
that the loss in welfare relative to the optimum is signiﬁcant if θ is required to
satisfy the constraints of E-stability and determinacy.
There is an additional issue with stability under learning that arises when
current data are not observable for the policy-maker. If private agents are using
constant-gain learning (see Section 5.2 for details), the stability conditions are
more demanding. As discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2007b), both hybrid
rules suggested by Svensson and Woodford (2005) and McCallum and Nelson
(2004), as well as the Taylor-type optimal rule of Duﬀy and Xiao (2007b), are
subject to the problem of instability under constant-gain learning for many
realistic gain parameter values.
3.3.3 Imperfect knowledge of structural parameters
A third practical concern is that the use of optimal rules requires knowledge
of the true values of the structural parameters on the part of the Central
Bank. Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a)
extend the basic analysis to a situation where the Central Bank estimates
the structural parameters ϕ and λ in equations (2.1)—(2.2) and in each
21period uses the current estimates in its optimal interest rate rule.21 The
basic results concerning optimal interest rate rules extend naturally to this
situation. The fundamental-based rules under commitment and discretion
are not learnable, while the corresponding expectations-based rules deliver
convergence of simultaneous learning by the private agents and the Central
Bank.
Since optimal monetary policy depends on structural parameters,
uncertainty about their values is an issue, even if asymptotically their
values can be learned by the Central Bank. Evans and McGough (2007)
examine optimal Taylor-type rules based on Bayesian model averaging, where
determinacy and stability under learning are imposed across all plausible
structural parameter values.
The importance of structural uncertainty is also stressed in Orphanides and
Williams (2007). Their model incorporates both imperfect knowledge about
the natural rates of interest and unemployment and constant-gain learning by
private agents. They emphasize monetary policy rules that are robust in all of
these dimensions.
4 Further developments
There has been a great deal of recent work that extends the results on monetary
policy and learning. Several of these are discussed in some detail below.
One of the more signiﬁcant issues, from an applied point of view, is
the issue of ‘constant’ gain or ‘perpetual’ learning, in which private agents
update estimates using least squares, but discount past data. Consequently,
under learning agents’ expectations never fully converge to the REE, but,
provided the REE is stable, have expectations that are (asymptotically) in
a neighborhood of the REE. Several papers discuss the issue of optimal
policy when the learning process itself is incorporated into the optimal policy
problem, either during the learning transition or under perpetual learning.
The main papers are Orphanides and Williams (2005b), Molnar and Santoro
(2006), Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006), Gaspar, Smets,and Vestin (2005)
and Orphanides and Williams (2007). A related issue studied by Ferrero (2007)
concerns speed of convergence of learning for alternative policy rules. Arifovic,
Bullard, and Kostyshyna (2007) consider the implications of social learning for
monetary policy rules.
Extensions of the learning stability results to open economy and
multi-country settings have been made by Llosa and Tuesta (2006), Bullard
and Schaling (2006), Bullard and Singh (2006), Zanna (2006), and Wang (2006)
among others. These papers examine both Taylor-type rules and interest-rate
rules that target real exchange rates.
In the standard New Keynesian model, monetary policy works entirely
via the demand side. Kurozumi (2006) and Llosa an Tuesta (2007) consider
how determinacy and learning conditions are altered when monetary policy
21It is natural to assume that the discount factor β and the policy weight α are known to
the Central Bank.
22has direct eﬀects on inﬂation. Kurozumi and Zandweghe (2007), Duﬀya n d
Xiao (2007a) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2007a) have examined in detail how
the learning stability conditions for Taylor rules are modiﬁed when capital is
incorporated into the New Keynesian model. The results for models with
capital depend on precisely how capital is modeled, ie on whether or not
adjustment costs are included and on whether there is ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital or
a rental market for capital. One result that emerges in some of these settings
is that determinacy and E-stability requires the interest-rate rule to have a
positive response to the output gap.
Detailed policy issues arise in which learning plays a key role. Some central
banks often set monetary policy based on the constant interest rate that is
expected to deliver a target inﬂation rate over a speciﬁed horizon. How this
aﬀects stability under learning is studied in Honkapohja and Mitra (2005a).
Transparency and communication of targets and rules are further considered
by Berardi and Duﬀy (2007) and Eusepi and Preston (2007).
While the New Keynesian model is based on a linearized set-up under
Calvo-type pricing, nonlinear settings based on quadratic costs of price
adjustments suggested by Rotemberg (1982) have been useful for studying
the possibility of liquidity trap equilibria.22 This issue was investigated
under perfect foresight by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001).
This set-up was investigated under learning for the case of ﬂexible prices
by Evans and Honkapohja (2005) and in a sticky-price version by Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2007). The latter paper is discussed further below.
Sticky-information models that incorporate learning have also been developed.
See Branch, Carlson, Evans, and McGough (2006b) and Branch, Carlson,
Evans, and McGough (2006a).
A number of theoretical learning topics have recently been pursued that
have a bearing on monetary policy issues. Forward-looking Taylor rules
can generate indeterminacy for some choices of parameters. In these cases
can stationary sunspot equilibria be stable under learning? For the New
Keynesian setting this issue has been examined by Honkapohja and Mitra
(2004), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004), and Evans and McGough (2005a),
where conditions for stable sunspots are obtained in linearized models, and
by Eusepi (2007), who looks at the question in a nonlinear setting. Evans,
Honkapohja, and Marimon (2007) show that stable sunspot equilibria can
arise in a cash-in-advance framework in which part of the government deﬁcit
is ﬁnanced by seigniorage.
Constant-gain learning raises the issue of the appropriate choice of gain
parameter (see Evans and Honkapohja, 1993, Chapter 14 of Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001, and Marcet and Nicolini, 2003). This issue is considered by
Evans and Ramey (2006) in a simple monetary set-up in which private agents
face an unknown regime switching process. This paper shows how the Lucas
Critique, based on RE, can carry over to learning dynamics in which agents
have misspeciﬁed models.
Monetary policy with near-rational expectations has been studied by
22Using a linearized New Keynesian model, the possibility of liquidity traps under learning
was studied by Bullard and Cho (2005).
23Woodford (2005) and Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2007). The Woodford
paper develops a (minmax) concept of policy robustness in which policy-makers
protect against agents’ expectations being distorted away from RE within some
class of near rational expectations. Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2007)
consider the possibility that ‘expert’ judgement based on extraneous factors
believed to be present can become almost self-fulﬁlling. They show how to alter
monetary policy to protect against these near-rational ‘exuberance equilibria.’
Heterogeneous expectations is another area increasingly receiving
attention. Theoretical work on monetary policy that allows for learning
heterogeneity across private agents, or between policy-makers and private
agents, includes Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2001), Giannitsarou
(2003), Honkapohja and Mitra (2005b), and Honkapohja and Mitra (2006). A
related line of thought (see Brock and Hommes, 1997, and Branch and Evans,
2006a) emphasizes that private agents may have diﬀerent types of predictors,
with the proportions of agents using the diﬀerent forecast methods changing
over time according to relative forecast performance. For an application to
monetary inﬂation models and monetary policy see Branch and Evans (2007)
and Brazier, Harrison, King, and Yates (2006).
A number of empirical applications of learning to macroeconomics and
monetary policy have recently been developed. Bullard and Eusepi (2005) and
Orphanides and Williams (2005c) look at estimated models that focus on the
explanation of the large increase in inﬂation rates in the 1970s. Incorporating
learning as a way to explain persistence in New Keynesian models has been
examined, using US data, by Milani (2005) and Milani (2007). First attempts
to incorporate learning to applied stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models have most recently been made, see Slobodyan and Wouters (2007) and
Murray (2007). Using least-squares learning models and/or dynamic predictors
to explain expectations data has been studied in Branch (2004), Branch and
Evans (2006b), Orphanides and Williams (2005a), Basdevant (2005), Pfajfar
(2007), and Pfajfar and Santoro (2007b).
Other important empirical learning papers include Marcet and Nicolini
(2003), which studies hyperinﬂation in South American countries (this paper
is discussed in detail below), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Sargent, Williams,
and Zha (2006), Ellison and Yates (2007), and Carboni and Ellison (2007).
The latter papers emphasize the importance of policy-maker model uncertainty
and the role of central bank learning in explaining the historical evolution of
inﬂation and unemployment in the post 1950 period.
In the next sections we discuss four recent topics that address important
applied questions. Learning plays a crucial role in these analyzes, but the main
focus in each case goes well beyond stability of REE under learning.
5 Perpetual learning and persistence
In the preceding sections our concern has been the stability of the REE under
least-squares (LS) learning. That is, we used LS learning to assess whether
an REE is attainable if we model agents as econometricians. Orphanides
24and Williams (2005b) (OW) show that taking the further step of replacing
(‘decreasing gain’) LS learning with constant-gain learning has important
implications for monetary policy, even if the REE is stable under learning.
OW work with a simple two-equation macro model. The ﬁrst equation is
a New Classical expectations-augmented Phillips curve with inertia
πt+1 = φπ
e
t+1 +( 1− φ)πt + αyt+1 + et+1 (5.1)
where πt+1 i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation between period t and period t +1 , πe
t+1 is
t h er a t eo fi n ﬂa t i o no v e rt h i sp e r i o de x p e c t e da tt i m et, yt+1 is the level of
t h eo u t p u tg a pi nt +1and et+1 is a white noise inﬂation shock. (1 − φ)πt
represents intrinsic inﬂation persistence. We assume 0 <φ<1.
The second equation is an aggregate demand relation that embodies a
lagged policy eﬀect
yt+1 = xt + ut+1
xt is set by monetary policy at t and ut+1 is white noise. Through monetary
p o l i c yi ti sa s s u m e dt h a tp o l i c y - m a k e r sa r ea b l eo n ep e r i o da h e a dt oc o n t r o l
aggregate output up to the unpredictable random disturbance ut+1.T h i s
equation basically replaces the IS and LM curves. It is convenient for the
task at hand, but of course suppresses issues of monetary control.
5.1 Optimal policy under rational expectations
At time t the only state variable is πt. Policy-makers have a target inﬂation
rate π∗ a n dc a r ea b o u tt h ed e v i a t i o no fπt from π∗. Their instrument is xt and
they are assumed to follow a rule of the form
xt = −θ(πt − π
∗) (5.2)
Policy-makers also care about the output gap yt+1. Since stable inﬂation
requires Eyt =0 , policy-makers are assumed to choose θ to minimize
L =( 1− ω)Ey
2
t + ωE(πt − π
∗)
2
This is a standard quadratic loss function. We can think of ω as reﬂecting
policy-makers preferences, which may (or may not) be derived from the
preferences of the representative agent.
Under RE, πe
t+1 = Etπt+1 and it follows that
π
e




Substituting into (5.1) yields
πt+1 = πt +
α
1 − φ
xt + αut+1 + et+1
Substituting in the policy rule (5.2) yields
˜ πt+1 =
µ
1 − φ − αθ
1 − φ
¶
˜ πt + αut+1 + et+1
25where ˜ πt = πt − π∗.
Computing E˜ π2
t and Ey2
t it is straightforward to minimize L over θ to get
θ





P is increasing in both ω and in the degree of inertia, 1−φ.V a r y i n g
ω leads to an eﬃciency frontier, described by a familiar trade-oﬀ between σπ
and σy, sometimes called the ‘Taylor curve.’

























Here noiset is white noise. The superscript ‘P’ refers to ‘perfect knowledge,’
which OW use as a synonym for RE.
Thus under RE the problem is quite straightforward. How ‘aggressive’
policy should be with respect to deviations of inﬂation from target depends in a
natural way on the structural parameters φ,α and the policy-maker preferences
as described by ω.
5.2 Least-squares learning
We now make the crucial step of backing away from RE. Instead of assuming
that agents are endowed ap r i o r iwith RE, we model the agents as forecasting
in the same way that an econometrician might: by assuming a simple time
series model for the variable of interest, and by estimating its parameters and
using the estimated model to forecast. Speciﬁcally, suppose private agents
believe that inﬂation follows an AR(1) process, as it does in an REE, but that
they do not know cP
0 ,c P
1 . Instead they estimate the parameters of
πt = c0 + c1πt−1 + vt
by a least-squares-type regression, and at time t forecast
π
e
t+1 = c0,t + c1,tπt
Over time the estimates c0,t,c 1,t are updated as new data become available.
We consider two cases for this updating.
First, suppose that agents literally do least squares using all the data.
We assume that policy-makers do not explicitly take account of private agent
learning and follow the feedback rule with θ = θ
P. Then, with ‘inﬁnite
memory’ (no discounting of observations), one can show that





26A s y m p t o t i c a l l y ,w eg e tt h eo p t i m a lR E E .
OW make a small but signiﬁcant change to the standard least-squares
updating formula. With regular LS each data point counts equally. When
expressed in terms of a recursive algorithm (‘recursive least squares’ or ‘RLS’)
the coeﬃcients estimates c0,t,c 1,t are updated in response to the most recent
data point with a weight proportion to the sample size 1/t.W eo f t e ns a yt h a t
RLS has a ‘decreasing gain’ since the ‘gain’ or weight on each data point is
κt =1 /t, which declines towards 0 as t →∞ . OW instead consider ‘constant
gain’ RLS in which past data is discounted. In terms of the RLS algorithm, this
is accomplished technically by setting the gain, the weight on the most recent
observation used to update estimates, to a small constant ie setting κt = κ (eg
0.05). This is equivalent to using weighted least squares with weights declining
geometrically in time as we move backwards from the current date.
Why would it be natural for agents to use a constant rather than decreasing
gain? The main rationale for this procedure is that it allows estimates to
remain alert to structural shifts. As economists, and as econometricians,
we tend to believe that structural changes occasionally occur, and we might
therefore assume that private agents also recognize and allow for this.
Although in principle one might attempt to model the process of structural
change, this tends to unduly strain the amount of knowledge we have about the
economic structure. A reasonable alternative is to adjust parameter estimators
to reﬂect the fact that recent observations convey more accurate information
on the economy’s law of motion than do data further in the past, and ‘constant
gain’ estimators are one very natural way of accomplishing this down-weighting
of past data. Another possibility that is sometimes used in practice is to use
a rolling data-window of ﬁnite length.23
5.3 Implications of constant-gain least squares
With constant-gain procedures, estimates no longer fully converge to the REE.
The estimators c0,t,c 1,t converge instead to a stochastic process. Because of
this OW use the term ‘perpetual learning’ to refer to the constant gain case.
If the gain parameter κ is very small, then estimators will be close to the
REE values for most of the time with high probability, and output and inﬂation
will be near their REE paths. Nonetheless, small plausible values like κ =0 .05
can lead to very diﬀerent outcomes in the calibrations OW consider. They
analyze the results using simulations, with φ =0 .75 and α =0 .25.T h e y
consider θ ∈ {0.1,0.6,1.0}, which corresponds to weights ω =0 .01,0.5 and 1,
respectively, under RE.
dfTheir main ﬁndings are: (i) the standard deviations of c0,t and c1,t are
large even though forecast performance remains good, (ii) there is a substantial
increase in the persistence of inﬂation, compared to the REE, as measured
by the AR(1) coeﬃcient for πt, and (iii) the policy frontier shifts out very
substantially and sometimes in a non-monotonic way.
23Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) discuss the implications of bounded memory as a model
of learning.
275.4 Policy implications





then they should choose a diﬀerent θ than under RE. Here the notation θ
S
is meant to indicate that we restrict policy-makers to choose from the same
‘simple’ class of policy rules. There are four main implications for policy in
the context of constant-gain (perpetual) learning by private agents. First,
the ‘naive’ policy choice, ie the policy that assumes RE (‘perfect knowledge’)
on the part of agents, can be strictly ineﬃcient when in fact the agents are
following perpetual learning with κ>0: there are cases in which increasing θ
S
above θ
P would decrease the standard deviations of both inﬂation and output.
Second, in general policy should be more hawkish, ie under perpetual learning
the monetary authorities should pick a larger θ
S than if agents had RE.
Third, following a sequence of unanticipated inﬂation shocks, inﬂation
doves (ie policy-makers with low θ reﬂecting a low ω) can do very poorly,
as these shocks can lead expectations to temporarily but persistently deviate
substantially from RE. Finally, if the inﬂation target π∗ is known to private
agents, so that they need estimate only the slope parameter c1 using the PLM
πt+1 − π
∗ = c1(πt − π
∗)+vt+1
then the policy frontier is more favorable than when the intercept c0 is not
known. One way to interpret this is that central bank transparency is useful.
Figure 5.1 indicates how the performance of policy depends on expectations
formation and what the policy-maker assumes about it. The middle curve is
the eﬃcient policy under learning, while ‘naive’ refers to the case in which
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Figure 5.1 Policy-maker’s loss
28Thus ‘perpetual learning’ turns out to have major policy implications for
policy, even when the deviation from REE might be thought not too large.
The main policy implication is that with perpetual learning, there should be
a policy bias towards ‘hawkishness.’ The intuition for this result is intuitive:
am o r eh a w k i s h( h i g hθ) policy helps to keep inﬂation expectations πe
t+1 ‘in
line,’ ie closer to RE values. This qualitative result also emerges in the more
general setting in Orphanides Orphanides and Williams (2007).
6 Estimated models with learning
The OW results suggest another implication of learning that goes beyond
policy, namely that learning itself can be a source of persistence in
macroeconomic dynamics. This line of thought has been pursued by Milani
(2005), Milani (2007). The starting point is that inﬂation persistence in
the data is much higher than arises from the basic New Keynesian model.
For a good empirical ﬁt to the data, a backward-looking component is
needed in the New Keynesian Phillips curve under the RE assumption. The
source of the backward-looking component used in these ‘hybrid’ models,
is, however, controversial. Milani (2005) considers the question of whether
learning dynamics can provide some or all of the persistence needed to ﬁtt h e
data.
To investigate this, consider the most frequently used modiﬁcation to the
basic New Keynesian model, namely adding indexation to Calvo price setting;
that is, ﬁrms that do not optimize in any given period set prices that are













where xt i st h eo u t p u tg a pa n dγ measures the degree of indexation. Earlier
work under RE empirically ﬁn d sv a l u e so fγ that are close to 1.
For expectations we assume a PLM of the form
πt = φ0 + φ1πt−1 + εt
and agents at t are assumed to use data {1,πi}
t−1
0 to estimate φ0,φ 1 using




tπt+1 = φ0,t + φ1,tE
∗
tπt
= φ0,t + φ1,t(φ0,t + φ1,tπt−1)
where we assume that the aggregate inﬂation rate πt is not included in the
agents information set at the time of their forecasts.













29Alternatively, Milani (2005) also considers using real marginal cost as the
driving variable in place of output gap xt. To estimate the model for the US,
Milani computes inﬂation from the GDP deﬂator and output gap as detrended
GDP, while real marginal cost is proxied by deviation of labor income share
from 1960:01 to 2003:04. Agents’ initial parameter estimates are obtained by
using pre-sample data 1951—1959.
A two-step procedure is used. First, the PLM is estimated from
constant-gain learning using an assumed constant gain of κ =0 .015.T h i si s
in line with earlier empirical estimates. Then Milani estimates the ALM using
nonlinear least squares. This procedure allows us to estimate the structural
source of persistence, γ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h el e a r n i n ge ﬀects. The PLM
parameter estimates show the following pattern:
(i) φ1,t was initially low in 1950s and 60s, then higher (up to 0.958), and then
declined somewhat to values above 0.8.
(ii) φ0,t was initially low, then became much higher and then gradually declined
after 1980.
The ALM structural estimates in particular generate a degree of indexation
of γ =0 .139 (with the output gap). The results are fairly robust to other
choices of gain κ that appear appropriate based on Schwartz’ BIC model ﬁt
criterion. The estimate of γ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and is in
sharp contrast to the high levels of γ found under the RE assumption. Thus it
appears that the data are consistent with the ‘learning’ interpretation of the
sources of persistence for inﬂation.
Milani (2007) estimates the full New Keynesian model under learning. He
ﬁnds that also the degree of habit persistence is low in IS curve. This is in
contrast with the usual extension of the New Keynesian model under RE that
is often employed to improve the empirical ﬁt of the model. Milani’s work can
be seen as a starting point for the very recent attempts by Wouters (2007) and
Murray (2007) to incorporate learning into DSGE models.
7 Recurrent hyperinﬂations
The paper by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) starts from the standard
hyperinﬂation model with learning and extends it to an open economy setting.
The aim is to provide a uniﬁed theory to explain the recurrent hyperinﬂations
experienced by many countries in the 1980s.
7.1 The basic hyperinﬂation model
The starting point is the theoretical model sometimes known as the seigniorage
model of inﬂation. (eg see Chapter 11 of Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). The
Cagan model is based on the linear money demand equation
M
d
t /Pt = φ − φγ(P
e
t+1/Pt) if 1 − γ(P
e
t+1/Pt) > 0 and 0 otherwise
30which can be obtained from an overlapping generations (OG) endowment
economy with log utility. This equation is combined with exogenous
government purchases dt > 0 that are entirely ﬁnanced by seigniorage
Mt = Mt−1 + dtPt
Rewriting this as Mt/Pt =( Mt−1/Pt−1)(Pt−1/Pt)+d, setting Md
t = Mt and








Under perfect foresight, ie Pe
t+1/Pt = Pt+1/Pt, there are two steady states,
βL <β H,p r o v i d e dd ≥ 0 is not too large, while if d is above a critical value
then there are no perfect foresight steady states. There is also a continuum of
perfect foresight paths converging to βH. Some early theorists suggested that
these paths might provide an explanation for actual hyperinﬂation episodes.
Consider now the situation under adaptive learning. Suppose the PLM is
that the inﬂation process is perceived to be a steady state, ie Pt+1/Pt = β+ηt,











1 − γβ − d/φ
≡ T(β;d)
Under steady-state learning, agents estimate β based on past average inﬂation,
ie (Pt+1/Pt)
e = βt where
βt = βt−1 + t
−1(Pt−1/Pt−2 − βt−1)
This is simply a recursive algorithm for the average inﬂation rate, which is
equivalent to a least-squares regression on a constant.24 It can be shown that
stability of this learning rule is governed by the E-stability diﬀerential equation
dβ/dτ = T(β;d) − β
where d is a ﬁxed parameter. Since 0 <T 0(βL) < 1 and T0(βH) > 1, βL is
E-stable, and therefore locally stable under learning, while βH is not. This is
illustrated in Figure 7.1.
24One can consider more general classes of PLM. Adam, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006)
study the circumstances in which autoregressive PLMs can converge to hyperinﬂation paths.
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Figure 7.1 Steady state learning in the hyperinﬂation model
We remark that an increase in d shifts T(β) up, so the comparative
statics of βL are natural but those of βH are counterintuitive. This, together
w i t ht h ef a c tt h a tt h es t e a d ys t a t eβH is not stable under learning suggests
problems with the RE version of this model as a theoretical explanation for
hyperinﬂations.
7.2 Empirical background
Marcet and Nicolini (MN) list four stylized facts about hyperinﬂation episodes
during the 1980s in a number of South American countries (as well as some
episodes in other places and at other times)
1. Recurrence of hyperinﬂation episodes.
2. ERR (exchange rate rules) stop hyperinﬂations, though new hyperinﬂations
eventually occur.
3 .D u r i n gah y p e r i n ﬂation, seigniorage and inﬂation are not highly correlated.
4. Average inﬂation and seigniorage are strongly positively correlated across
countries. Hyperinﬂations only occur in countries where seigniorage is on
average high.
Stabilization plans to deal with hyperinﬂation have been based either on
heterodox policy (ERR) or orthodox policy (permanently reducing the deﬁcit).
Policies that combine both elements appear to have been successful in stopping
hyperinﬂations permanently.
327.3 The Marcet-Nicolini model
MN use an open economy version of the overlapping-generations hyperinﬂation
model. This is a ﬂexible price model with PPP, so that
P
f
t et = Pt
where P
f
t is the foreign price of goods, assumed exogenous. There is a
cash-in-advance constraint for local currency on net purchases of consumption.
This generates the demand by young agents for the local currency. Hence
we continue to have the money demand equation as in the basic model.
Government expenditure dt is assumed to be iid.
T h e r ea r et w oe x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e s .I nt h eﬂoating regime the government
does not buy or sell foreign exchange, and its budget constraint is as in the
basic model. There is no foreign trade, and the economy behaves just like the




In the ERR (exchange rate rule) regime, the government buys or sells
foreign exchange Rt as needed to meet a target exchange rate et.S a l e s
of foreign exchange generate revenue in addition to seigniorage that the
government can use to ﬁnance government purchases, ie (Mt − Mt−1)/Pt =
dt +( ( Rt − Rt−1)et)/Pt. In equilibrium, any increase in reserves must be
matched by a trade surplus, ie (Rt − Rt−1)et = TB t · Pt,w h e r eTB t is total
endowment minus total private consumption minus dt.
The key question is the form of the ERR. When an ERR is adopted it is
assumed that the object is to stabilize inﬂation at a targeted rate ¯ β.T h i si s














Under ERR this last equation determines Pt. Given expectations, money
demand determines Mt. Reserves Rt must then adjust to satisfy the ﬂow
government budget constraint.
The remaining question is how the government chooses exchange rate
regimes. We assume there is a maximum inﬂation rate tolerated, βU.E R Ri s
imposed only in periods when inﬂation would otherwise exceed this bound (or
if no positive Pt would otherwise clear the market).
7.4 Learning
M Na r g u et h a tu n d e rR Et h em o d e lc a n n o tp r o p e r l ye x p l a i nt h es t y l i z e d
facts of hyperinﬂation outlined above. An adaptive learning formulation will
33be more successful. MN use a variation of the simple (decreasing gain)
steady-state learning rule, given above, in which the gain is made state
contingent








with given β0.H e r e 1/αt = κt is what we have called the gain, and
αt = αt−1 +1corresponds to decreasing gain learning, while αt =¯ α>1 is a
constant-gain algorithm. (αt can also be thought of as the ‘eﬀective sample
size’). MN consider a version in which agents switch between decreasing and






¯ ¯ ¯ falls below some bound υ and otherwise αt =¯ α.
T h eq u a l i t a t i v ef e a t u r e so ft h em o d e la r ea p p r o x i m a t e db yt h es y s t e m
Pt
Pt−1
= h(βt−1,d t) where (7.1)
h(β,d)=
½
T(β;d) if 0 <T(β;d) <β U
¯ β otherwise
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Figure 7.2 Inﬂation as a function of expected inﬂation
There is a stable region consisting of values of β below the ‘unstable’ high
inﬂation steady state βH and an unstable region that lies above it. Here we
set ¯ β = βL,t h el o wi n ﬂation steady state. βU is set at a value above βH.T h i s
gives rise to very natural recurring hyperinﬂation dynamics: Starting from βL
a sequence of random shocks may push βt into the unstable region, at which
point the gain is revised upward to 1/¯ α and inﬂation follows an explosive path
34until it is stabilized by ERR. Then the process begins again. The model with
learning has the following features
(i) There may be eventual convergence to RE. This can occur if the random
shocks/learning dynamics do not push βt into the unstable regionfor a long
time. Then decreasing gain may lead to asymptotic convergence to βL.
(ii) A higher E(dt) makes average inﬂation higher and the frequency of
hyperinﬂations greater. Orthodox combined with heterodox policies make
s e n s ea saw a yt oe n dh y p e r i n ﬂations.
(iii) All four stylized facts listed above can be matched using this model, and
simulations of a calibrated model look very plausible.
Overall this appears to be a very successful application of boundedly rational
learning to a major empirical issue.
8 Liquidity traps and deﬂationary spirals
Deﬂation and liquidity traps have been a concern in recent times. The paper
by Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) considers issues of liquidity traps
and deﬂationary spirals under learning in a New Keynesian model. As we
have seen, contemporaneous Taylor-type interest-rate rules should respond to
the inﬂation rate more than one for one in order to ensure determinacy and
stability under learning. However, as emphasized by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe,
and Uribe (2001), if one considers the interest-rate rule globally, not just in
a neighborhood of the target inﬂation rate, the requirement that net nominal
interest rates must be nonnegative implies that the rule must be nonlinear and
also, for any continuous rule, that there exists a second steady state at a lower
(possibly negative) inﬂation rate. This is illustrated in Figure 8.1, which shows
the interest-rate policy R =1+f(π) as a function of π.25 The straight line in
the ﬁgure is the Fisher equation R = π/β, which is obtained from the usual
Euler equation for consumption in a steady state.
Here we are now using R to stand for the interest rate factor (so that the
n e ti n t e r e s tr a t ei sR − 1), and πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the inﬂation factor, so that
π − 1 is the net inﬂation rate. In the Figure π∗ denotes the intended steady
state, at which the ‘Taylor principle’ of a more than one-for-one response is
satisﬁed, and πL is the unintended steady state. πL may correspond to either a
very low positive inﬂation rate or to a negative net inﬂation rate, ie deﬂation.
The zero lower bound corresponds to R =1 . Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and
Uribe (2001) show that under RE, there is a continuum of ‘liquidity trap’ paths
that converge on πL. The pure RE analysis thus suggests a serious risk of the
economy following these ‘liquidity trap’ paths.
What happens under learning? In Evans and Honkapohja (2005) we
analyzed a ﬂexible-price perfect competition model. We showed that
deﬂationary paths are possible, but that the real risk, under learning, were
paths in which inﬂation slipped below πL a n dt h e nc o n t i n u e dt of a l lf u r t h e r .
25Of course, Taylor rules usually also include a dependence on aggregate output, which
we omit for simplicity.
35For this ﬂexible-price model we showed that this could be avoided by a change
in monetary policy at low inﬂation rates. The required policy is to switch to
an aggressive money supply rule at some inﬂation rate between πL and π∗.







Figure 8.1 Multiple steady states with global Taylor rule
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) reconsider the issues in a model that
allows for sticky prices and deviations of output from ﬂexible-price levels. They
consider a representative-agent inﬁnite-horizon dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with (i) monopolistic competition (ii) price-adjustment
costs. Monetary policy follows a global Taylor-rule as above. Fiscal policy
is standard: exogenous government purchases gt and Ricardian tax policy that
depends on real debt level. The model is essentially a New Keynesian model,
except that, in line with Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001), it has
Rotemberg (1982) costs of price adjustment as the friction rather than Calvo
pricing. The model equations are nonlinear, and the nonlinearity in its analysis
under learning is retained.
T h ek e ye q u a t i o n sa r e
αγ
ν



























The ﬁrst equation is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, relating πt positively
to πe
t+1 and to measures of aggregate activity. The second equation is the New
Keynesian IS curve, obtained from the usual household Euler equation. When
linearized around a steady state, both of these equations are identical in form
to the standard New Keynesian equations. There are also money and debt
evolution equations.
It is easily established that there are two stochastic steady states at πL and
πH. If the random shocks are iid then ‘steady-state’ learning is appropriate












t + φt(ct−1 − c
e
t)
where φt is the gain sequence. The main ﬁn d i n g sa r et h a tw h i l et h ei n t e n d e d
steady state at π∗ is locally stable under learning, the unintended steady
state at πL is unstable under learning. The key observation is that πL is a
saddlepoint, which implies the existence of deﬂationary spirals under learning.
In particular, an expectational shock can lead to suﬃciently pessimistic
expectations, and ce,π e will follow paths leading to deﬂation and stagnation.
This is illustrated in Figure 8.2, based on E-stability dynamics.
• A
Figure 8.2 πe and ce dynamics under normal policy
The intuition for the result can be seen by supposing that we are initially
near the πL steady state and considering a small drop in πe.W i t h ﬁxed R
t h i sw o u l dl e a dt h r o u g ht h eI Sc u r v et ol o w e rc and thus, through the Phillips
curve, to lower π.A s u ﬃcient reduction in R would be able to avoid the
reductions in c and π, but since we are close to the zero lower bound this is
not possible and the global Taylor rule here dictates only small reductions in
R. The falls in realized c and π then under learning leads to reductions in ce
and πe, and this sets in motion the deﬂationary spiral.
Thus, under normal policy the intended steady state is not globally stable
under learning. Large adverse shocks to expectations or structural changes
can set in motion unstable downward paths. Can policy be altered to avoid
37deﬂationary spiral? Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) show that it can.
The recommended policy is to set a minimum inﬂation threshold ˜ π,w h e r e
πL < ˜ π<π ∗. For example, if the global Taylor rule is chosen so that πL
corresponds to deﬂation, then a convenient choice for the threshold would be
zero net inﬂation, ie ˜ π =1 . The authorities would follow normal monetary
and ﬁscal policy provided this delivers πt > ˜ π. However, if πt threatens to fall
below ˜ π under normal policy, then aggressive policies would be implemented
to ensure that πt =˜ π: interest rates would be reduced, if necessary to near
the zero lower bound R =1 , and if this is not suﬃcient, then government
purchases gt would be increased as required.
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2007) show that these policies can indeed
ensure πt ≥ ˜ π always under learning, and that incorporating aggressive
monetary and ﬁscal policies triggered by an inﬂation threshold ˜ π leads to
global stability of the intended steady state at π∗. Perhaps surprisingly, it is
also shown that it is essential to use an inﬂation threshold. They show that
using instead an output threshold to trigger aggressive polices will not always
avoid deﬂationary spirals.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
Expectations play a large role in modern macroeconomics. While the
RE assumption is the natural benchmark, it is implausibly demanding.
Realistically, it should be assumed that people are smart, but boundedly
rational. How should we model bounded rationality? We recommend the
‘principle of cognitive consistency’: economic agents should be about as smart
as (good) economists. Since when economists need to make forecasts, they do
so using econometric models, a particularly natural choice is to model agents
as econometricians.
In many economic models, with an appropriate econometric perceived law
of motion, convergence to RE is possible. However, stability of REE under
private agent learning is not automatic. Our central message is that monetary
policy must be designed to ensure both determinacy and stability under
learning. This observation leads to particular choices of interest-rate rules,
whether we are considering standard classes of instrument rules or designing
optimal monetary policy. Instrument rules that respond appropriately to
‘nowcasts’ perform well in this respect, but implementing optimal policy
appears to require an appropriate response to private sector expectations about
the future.
More generally, policy-makers need to use policy to guide expectations, and
the recent literature provides several important illustrations. If under learning
there are persistent deviations from fully rational expectations, then monetary
policy may need to respond more aggressively to inﬂation in order to stabilize
expectations. The learning literature has also shown how to guide the economy
under extreme threats of either hyperinﬂation or deﬂationary spirals. As we
have illustrated, appropriate monetary and ﬁscal policy design can minimize
these risks.
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